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REFLECTIONS ON “UNCAUSED BEGINNINGS”
William Lane Craig
Graham Oppy’s interesting analysis of the “causal shape” of reality conflates 
causal ordering with temporal ordering of causes and assigns the wrong 
causal shape to reality as conceived by many classical theists. His argument 
for the possibility of uncaused beginnings is also hobbled by his tendency to 
ignore the crucial issue of the objective reality of tense and temporal becom-
ing. Oppy’s claims that only certain types of things can come into being un-
caused at a first moment of time and that things cannot now come into being 
uncaused are examined and found implausible and explanatorily vacuous.
Introduction
Although Graham Oppy’s interest in the possibility of uncaused begin-
nings springs from his concern with cosmological arguments for God’s 
existence,1 the truth of the causal premiss featured in at least one version 
of the argument, namely, that everything that begins to exist has a cause, is of 
such general metaphysical importance that it ought to interest any meta-
physician. Unfortunately, Oppy’s article gets off to an uncertain start as a 
result of certain problematic features of his characterization of fundamen-
tal notions in his introductory section.
First, there is the ambiguity of what is meant by an “initial state.” Later 
sections of the article make it clear that Oppy’s concern is with temporally 
initial states. But that is not how initial states are characterized in his in-
troductory section. Rather, there states are repeatedly said to be ordered 
“under the causal relation.” Thus, the series of states so ordered could all 
be simultaneous. States which form a circle under the causal relation, for 
example, need not require that time is cyclical, for the states may all obtain 
at once, rather like the four-intercalated flaps of a box top, each holding 
down another. Thomas Aquinas’ argument against an infinite regress of 
causes, which plays so central a role in the first three of his Five Ways, 
similarly concerned causes which are, as he put it, “essentially ordered,” 
rather than temporally or “accidentally” ordered. On Aquinas’ view, it is 
a matter of indifference whether temporal states take the accidental causal 
shape of Regress, Circle, or Contingent Initial State—in each case states 
1See his Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. ix, as well as his Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
pp. 148–153.
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must be sustained in being by God, who is prior to all other states under 
the ancestral of the essential causal relation. In order to rule out such pos-
sibilities, Oppy must be assuming that causal directionality entails tem-
poral ordering of cause and effect. But the metaphysician will rightly be 
sceptical of any such attempt to rule out the possibility of simultaneous, 
essentially ordered causes by mere stipulation.
Second, even if we suppose that states which are ordered under the 
causal relation are necessarily also ordered under the earlier than relation, 
it is unclear why “naturalism would be preferable to theism,” as Oppy 
claims, if states of reality had the causal shape of Contingent Initial State.2 
Indeed, a good many, if not most, contemporary theistic philosophers hold 
that this is the causal shape of reality. For the initial state prior to all oth-
ers under the ancestral of the causal relation is taken to be God’s bringing 
the universe into being. Since God’s so doing is a free action, such a state 
is contingent, despite the metaphysical necessity of God’s existing. Real-
ity thus has the causal shape of Contingent Initial State. Mutakallimum, or 
proponents of the kalam cosmological argument, given their strong com-
mitment to divine freedom,3 embrace this view, rejecting Regress, Circle, 
and Necessary Initial State as possible causal shapes of reality. Ironically, 
then, mutakallimum will reject the first premiss of the argument Oppy re-
constructs, namely,
1. If it is possible for reality to have a contingent initial state under the 
causal relation, then it is possible for other (non-overlapping) parts 
of reality to have no cause.
Proponents of the kalam cosmological argument will maintain that while 
reality must have a contingent initial state if the existence of the universe 
is to be plausibly explained, it is impossible for any existing thing, wheth-
er occupying an initial state or a later state of reality, to come into being 
without a cause.
Third, Oppy’s reconstruction of the argument on behalf of the causal 
premiss of the kalam cosmological argument neglects a crucial assumption 
of kalam: the view that time is tensed and temporal becoming is an ob-
jective feature of reality. Oppy’s tenselessly formulated premisses are en-
2It is worth noting that even Regress need not imply that physical states of reality are 
sempiternal. So thinking implicitly presupposes that the causal states so ordered are all iso-
chronous, i.e., of the same temporal duration. But if the states are allowed to progressively 
diminish in duration as one regresses in time, then the regress may be of finite duration even 
though it lacks an initial state. Even if there was no first instant of the universe’s existence, 
the universe may nonetheless be finite in the past and therefore, in that sense at least, have 
begun to exist, thus requiring a transcendent cause. Reality as a whole, however, would not 
be characterized by Regress because the state of God’s causing the universe would be an 
initial state of reality. If we deny that causal priority implies temporal priority, then there 
is still a causally initial state of reality, viz., God’s bringing the universe into being, even if 
there is no initial temporal state of reality, so that the correct model would be, not Regress, 
but Contingent Initial State.
3As comes to expression in their espousal of the Principle of Determination, on which see 
my The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 47–49, 150–151.
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tirely compatible with a metaphysic of tenseless time, according to which 
the parts of reality referred to in the premisses do not come into being 
at all but simply exist tenselessly at their appointed stations. On such a 
tenseless view of time, it is far less obvious that parts of reality which ex-
ist later than the initial state must have causes and that the things existing 
tenselessly at the initial state cannot exist without a cause, since they do 
not come into being at that time. If Oppy is to allow the argument in ques-
tion its full intuitive force, then it must be reformulated along tensed lines. 
For example:
1´. If it is possible for something to come into being without a cause at a 
first moment of time, then it is possible for things to come into being 
without a cause at later moments of time.
2´. It is not possible for things to come into being without a cause at 
later moments of time.
3´. Therefore, it is not possible for something to come into being with-
out a cause at a first moment of time.
The driving force behind the arguments is the intuition that there is noth-
ing about temporal moments as such that could make their location rel-
evant to whether something can spring into being at that point without a 
cause of any sort.
1
In section 1 of his article Oppy discusses how a naturalist would defend 
the claim that while it is possible for reality to have an uncaused, contin-
gent initial state, it is nonetheless impossible for later parts of reality to be 
uncaused. To my mind the argument of this section constitutes a virtual 
reductio of the naturalist’s position.4 As Oppy explains, the naturalist will 
say that the contingent things that feature in the initial state of reality are 
the only kinds of things that can have no cause. Since we are discussing 
naturalism here, the claim is effectively that, for example, only some sort 
of fundamental entity described by a quantum gravitational Theory of 
Everything can pop into being uncaused but that later things, say, tigers 
or bottles of root beer or Beethoven must have causes of their coming into 
being. As Oppy explains, this claim plausibly commits the naturalist to 
two further claims: first, that such entities can come into existence only at 
a first moment of time and, second, that things which come into being at 
later times could not come into being at a first moment of time. As Oppy 
recognizes, the naturalist is thereby committed to holding that the entities 
4Oppy’s analysis is thus helpful in exposing the implausibility of Wes Morriston’s claim 
that while things cannot come into being uncaused at embedded moments of time, they can 
do so at a first moment of time (Wes Morriston, “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have 
a Personal Cause?” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 94–105). As Oppy shows, Morriston is 
thereby plausibly committed to Oppy’s implausible theses that certain things are essentially 
capable of coming to exist only at a first moment of time and other things essentially capable 
of coming to exist only at embedded moments of time.
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in question have the essential property of coming to exist only at a first 
moment of time and other things all have the essential property of existing 
only at embedded moments of time.
These suppositions strike me as simply fantastic. Why is it that only 
a certain kind of particle, say, can come into being uncaused at the first 
moment of time? Obviously we cannot say that nothingness has a pecu-
liar disposition to producing such particles, as so saying reifies nothing-
ness and invests it with properties. It is baffling, then, to see why, say, a 
bottle of root beer might not have featured in the initial state of reality. 
(If one stumbles at design features of a bottle of root beer, substitute 
other elementary particles like photons or electrons.) Equally baffling 
is the claim that it is impossible that particles which sprang into being 
uncaused at the first moment of time should do so later on. Since no 
causes govern their coming into being, one would think when they do so 
is wholly arbitrary.
Oppy’s “clear answer” to these questions is merely a reiteration of the 
naturalist’s commitments. It is explanatorily vacuous. What we want to 
know is why the entities have these odd essential properties, which are, 
after all, not qualities of the entities in question but more like arbitrarily 
asserted predications masquerading as qualities.
2
In section 2 Oppy takes cognizance of the objection that it is arbitrary for 
the naturalist to single out certain sorts of things as uncaused features of 
an initial contingent state of reality, since there is nothing to constrain what 
comes into being at that moment. Oppy rejoins that if it were really pos-
sible for a rabbit, say, to feature in an initial state of reality, then it would 
have to be possible for the initial state to be nothing but a rabbit, which 
is manifestly impossible. Of course, I agree that it is obviously impossible 
that the first state of reality should be a rabbit, since I hold that things can-
not come into being uncaused. But, first, I fail to see why it is impossible, if 
things can come into being without a cause, the initial state might not have 
been a single rabbit. It might exist for no more than an arbitrarily short 
moment, but that is irrelevant. A fundamental failing of Oppy’s argument 
in this section seems to be his assumption that the things which feature 
in an initial state of reality must be capable of persisting, which is just not 
true. Besides, we can substitute other entities which can exist apart from 
larger networks, such as various elementary particles. If quantum gravita-
tional particles can feature in the initial state of reality, why not electrons 
instead? Second, even if rabbits can exist only as parts of larger networks 
of related entities, we are still left wondering why, if things can really pop 
into being without a cause, whole interrelated networks do not and can-
not pop into being without a cause. Why could our whole solar system 
not pop into being uncaused with uncaused rabbits scampering about on 
an uncaused Earth? We can make the network as large and elaborate as 
desired; after all, nothing constrains us.
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3
In section 3 Oppy tackles the deeper metaphysical claims about modality 
and causation that would render the naturalist’s position plausible. But 
it seems to me that the account of modality and causation proffered by 
Oppy in order to explain how only the things featured in an initial contin-
gent state of the universe can come into being uncaused is explanatorily 
vacuous, being tantamount to mere reassertion of his afore-stated natural-
istic principles. Its stipulation that all possible worlds have the same initial 
state as the actual world is an ad hoc conjecture no more plausible than the 
naturalistic principles limned in section 1. So I do not see how these views 
about modality and causation can be said to provide serious support for 
Oppy’s principles.
4
In section 4 Oppy focuses on the universe as we know it in order to con-
struct a plausible case for the claim that things cannot now come into be-
ing uncaused, a case which is compatible with things’ coming into being 
uncaused at the beginning of the universe. The rough idea is that before 
some concrete object can occupy the space currently occupied by another 
concrete object, the current occupant must vacate the space to make room 
for the new object. The “before” here has to do with priority “in the caus-
al order,” not the temporal order. In the temporal order the evacuation 
and occupation of the space are presumably simultaneous. According to 
Oppy, it cannot be that the coming into existence of the new object brings 
it about that the former occupant ceases to occupy the space, since non-
existent things do not have causal powers and the new object does not 
begin to exist until it occupies some space. Therefore, Oppy infers that 
the former occupant’s ceasing to occupy the space is a cause of the new 
object’s coming into being. Therefore, the new object does not come into 
being uncaused after all.
This account of the matter strikes me as perverse. Just as a bubble form-
ing in a liquid displaces some of the liquid occupying a certain spatial vol-
ume, so an object coming into being without a cause displaces any object 
currently occupying a certain spatial volume. If this is correct, then the new 
object’s occupying the region is causally prior to the former occupant’s va-
cating it. Oppy thinks that this account cannot be correct because the new 
object does not begin to exist until it occupies some spatial location. Now 
the “until” here must have reference to the temporal order of events, and 
certainly the new object does not exist before it occupies a certain volume 
of space. In the temporal order, its existing, its occupying a certain spatial 
volume, and its displacing the former occupant of that volume are all si-
multaneous. But such coincidence in the temporal order has no relevance 
to the causal order. In the causal order the new object’s coming into being 
at some place causes the former occupant to vacate the space. At the time 
this happens the new object does exist; indeed, this event occurs at the first 
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moment of its existence. By contrast, on Oppy’s view the current occu-
pant’s vacating the space causes the new object to come into being, which 
is clearly wrong-headed. Indeed, on Oppy’s view we are left wondering 
why an object of precisely the same shape and size did not come into being 
as a result of the evacuation of a certain spatial region by an object. Why 
would the movement of a table cause a tiger to pop into being?
What is especially strange about Oppy’s line of argument is that his 
disallowing things to pop into existence uncaused at non-initial moments 
of time is based, not on the intuitively obvious truth that things like tigers 
cannot pop into being, but rather on the alleged fact that their popping 
into being is not, strictly speaking, uncaused. Tigers and the like on the 
proffered account can, indeed, pop suddenly into existence when some-
thing moves out of their way. The only difference between them and the 
quantum gravitational particles which pop into being at the beginning of 
the universe is that space comes into being along with the particles rather 
than precedes them. This is hardly a realistic and convincing account of 
why, if such particles could pop into being at the first moment of the uni-
verse’s existence, they do not do so now nor why other things are not pop-
ping into existence now. Oppy insists that his account does not stipulate 
that the sole cause of things’ popping into being is the existence of appro-
priately shaped spaces which are consistent with their occupation by an 
object of a certain kind. Granted, but we still are left wondering why such 
events are either impossible or have a vanishingly small probability.
5
In the final section of his paper, Oppy recognizes that his theorizing may 
have gone wrong in various ways, but he claims to have achieved the 
main aim of the paper, namely, to show (i) that it is possible for naturalists 
to engage in this kind of metaphysical theorizing, and (ii) that there can 
be no justified assessment of the theoretical merits of the products of such 
theorizing that does not look at the details of the theories in question. That 
this is the paper’s main aim comes as a bit of a surprise, since that aim is 
considerably more modest than the aim staked out in the paper’s initial 
abstract, namely, to defend the view that it is possible for reality to have 
an uncaused initial state even though this is impossible for any later state. 
That being said, I hardly imagine that anyone should care to deny (i). 
But (ii) is importantly ambiguous. Obviously, one cannot assess the theo-
retical merits of the products of someone’s theorizing unless one knows 
what those specific products are! But (ii) is, I fear, an expression of Oppy’s 
general strategy to forestall indefinitely acceptance of cosmological argu-
ments of natural theology by so overloading their proponents with a mul-
titude of profound philosophical conundrums before such arguments can 
be considered to be good arguments that a kind of paralysis is induced.5 
5See Oppy, Arguing about Gods, pp. 170–171 and my complaints about this strategy in 
my critical notice of Arguing about Gods, by Graham Oppy, Philosophia Christi 10 (2008), pp. 
435–442.
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This sort of suspension of judgement with respect to the causal principle 
that everything that begins to exist has a cause has not been justified, I think, 
by Oppy’s paper. That principle is so perspicuous that it is reasonable to 
rest with one’s affirmation of its truth unless and until naturalistic theo-
rizing such as Oppy envisions serves to dislodge it from our convictions. 
Oppy’s disquisitions in this paper hardly rise to that level.
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